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Abstract: Despite the attempts made by radical Islamists to engulf the 
political arena of post-Suharto Indonesia by promoting mandatory 
implementation of shari’a law and jihad, Indonesia has witnessed a new 
trend in the discourses, actions and movements that seek to push Islam 
into the center stage. The strategy of implementing the shari‘a from below, 
promoting da‘wa (Islamic proselytizing) and non-violent endeavors has 
been appealing and considered more appropriate to deal with the current 
situations. There is reason to believe that Indonesia today is in the throes 
of a post-Islamist path. A sort of synthesis between the call for Islam’s 
importance for public life and democracy, post-Islamism has emerged to be 
an alternative to Islamist radicalism. Through its endeavour to fuse 
religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, as well as Islam and liberty, this 
post-Islamist alternative has enabled Muslims to express their religious 
beliefs and practices,without plunging into violence and joining a cycle of 
militancy.  
Keywords: Post-Islamism, Politic, and Indonesia 
 
A. Introduction 
Has the threat of Islamism, largely defined as political discourse 
and activism that aim to change the secular system of society and the state 
to create an Islamic country by exploiting religious symbols and identities, 
come to an end in Indonesia?2 This question should be posed given the 
demonstrations by radical Islamists who have actively pushed for the 
implementation of the shari’a (Islamic law) and even jihad in several areas 
                                                          
1 An earlier version of this article has been published as “Post-Islamist Politics 
in Indonesia”, in Asef Bayat, ed., Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 157-184.    
2 Scholars of political Islam such as Gilles Kepel, Oliver Roy, and John L. 
Esposito, to mention but a few names, have debated the appropriateness and usefulness 
of the term Islamism. For a new debate on the term and contested perspectives on its 
meaning inspired by events after 9/11, refer, for instance, to Richard C. Martin and 
Abbas Barzegar, eds., Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political Islam (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2010). 
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of communal conflict in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto in May 1998. 
These events are very much alive in our collective memory. As a 
consequence of the rising tide of Islamist radicalism, many observers 
during the first decade of post-Suharto Indonesia imagined a bleak future 
for the most populous Muslim country in the world, one that may today 
be no different from Pakistan or even Iraq, countries that are gradually 
being sucked into a maelstrom of political and religious violence. 
However, after less than fifteen years it has become apparent that these 
observers need to adjust their pessimistic accounts, in line with 
Indonesia’s growing democracy, which is now characterized by flourishing 
political activities based on electoral politics within the framework of a 
democratic system. 
Some skeptics still judge Indonesia’s emergent democracy as 
superficial, based on their assumption that it remains procedural rather 
than functional and is driven by political money and manipulation. 
Nonetheless, one cannot deny the reality of an electoral democratic 
system that guarantees much broader public participation in politics, 
although this participation may lack depth. Moreover, since democracy 
allows multiple opinions to emerge and claim space on the surface, it 
guarantees that radical Islamists’ attempt to take control of the Indonesian 
public sphere will end in failure. Indeed, the ongoing consolidation of 
democracy has contributed to the weakening influence of radical Islamist 
movements that reject multiculturalism and citizenship, the foundations 
of democratic life. There is reason to believe that the era of high-profile 
politics staged by the militant Islamist groups has shifted toward a strategy 
of implementing the shari’a from below. Attempts to give the shari’a 
constitutional status and thereby enforce it at the state level ended in 
failure, attracting insufficient support in the People’s Consultative 
Assembly. This failure ultimately serves to highlight the marginal position 
of militant Muslims and their unsuccessful efforts to popularize their 
discourse glorifying militancy and violence. 
This paper aims to understand the shifting patterns of Islamic 
political activism in post-Suharto Indonesia and how this phenomenon is 
related to the nation’s ongoing democratic consolidation and the 
moderate Muslims’ campaign for democratic Islam. The central question 
to be tackled here is whether Indonesia is in the throes of forging a post-
Islamist path. After a brief theoretical discussion on the concept of post-
Islamism, this chapter looks at the historical context of the rise of Islamist 
radicalism that has threatened the burgeoning of democratic Islam in 
Indonesia and how it has been changing toward the call for 
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implementation of the shari’a at the personal level through da’wa (Islamic 
proselytizing). Next, it discusses the relentless effort by moderate Muslims 
to call for democratic Islam that has contributed to the weakening of the 
influence of radical Islamism. Finally, it examines the way the Prosperous 
Justice Party has negotiated its Islamist identity and ideology with the 
pragmatic politics of power sharing in the realities of the democratic 
electoral process. 
 
B. Post-Islamism 
Recent academic debates on the Muslim world have seen a major 
shift in the pattern of Islamic activism, from collective activism that is 
revolutionary in character toward an individual activism that accepts the 
imperatives of modern life. If the first is shaped by ideologies, what Asef 
Bayat defines as “post-Islamism” distances itself from political nuances 
and collective militancy while still ensuring harmonization and parallelism 
between Islam and modernity.3 Post-Islamism is conceptualized by Bayat 
as a “conscious attempt to strategize the rationale and modalities of 
transcending Islamism in social, political, and intellectual domains.” 
Representing “an endeavour to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and 
freedom, Islam and liberty,” it renders religion into a plural reality with 
multiple meanings and accommodates aspects of democratization, 
pluralism, multiculturalism, and human rights. Bayat further argues that: 
 
post-Islamism serves primarily as theoretical construct to 
signify change, difference, and the root of change... The 
advent of post-Islamism does not necessarily mean the 
historical end of Islamism. What it means is the birth, out 
of the Islamist experience, of a qualitatively different 
discourse and practice.4 
 
Post-Islamism is embedded in the process of cultural transaction 
that reflects how global cultures are assimilated in a locality. In today’s 
society it seems difficult to separate the process of social, cultural, and 
political change from the development of global dynamics. Undeniably, 
the advancement of information and communication technology has 
significantly affected everyday lives in almost all parts of the world, with 
                                                          
3 Asef Bayat, “What Is Post-Islamism?” ISIM Review 16, no. 5 (2005):  5; see 
also Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic. Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 10–11. 
4 Bayat, “What is Post-Islamism?”, 5. 
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several significant repercussions. Globalization has not only changed the 
way people relate to space but also contributed to the creation of a 
homogenized culture, toward a synchronization of taste, consumption, 
and lifestyle.5 On a more positive note, globalization has also deepened 
the penetrative forces of modern values such as democracy, tolerance, and 
human rights. 
In parallel with the rapid process of globalization, the Muslim 
world has in fact seen major transformations. These include a greater 
sense of autonomy for both men and women and the emergence of a 
public sphere in which politics and religion are subtly intertwined. Mass 
education and mass communications have facilitated an awareness in 
Muslims of the need to reconfigure the nature of religious thought and 
action, create new forms of public space, and encourage debate over 
meaning. Within this context Islam has become the subject of dialogue 
and civil debate. Open contests over the use of the symbolic language of 
Islam and its meanings have increasingly shaped this new sense of public 
space that is discursive, performative, and participative. In such 
engagements, publicly shared ideas of community, identity, and leadership 
take new shapes.6 
One noticeable effect of these developments is the proliferation of 
forms of piety that appear as congruent with the principles of individual 
freedom and democracy and are removed from their traditional religious 
moorings. Islam is presented in a way that is sophisticated, fresh, and 
hybrid, in order to make it an appealing alternative to urban, capitalist 
cultures. This has given rise to a sense of personalized Muslimhood, 
which conceals a clear shift from the earlier emphasis of Islamism on the 
Islamist polity to one on personal piety.7 The model of Muslimhood 
presents both a challenge and an opportunity to rethink the established 
boundaries between the private and the public. Now individuals can 
                                                          
5 Arjun Appadurai, “The Production of Locality,” in Counterworks: Managing the 
Diversity of Knowledge, ed. Richard Fardon (London: Routledge, 1995), 208–229; see also 
Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, vol. II: The Power of Identity 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). 
6 See, for instance, Armando Salvatore, “The Genesis and Evolution of ‘Islamic 
Publicness’ under Global Constraints,” Journal of Arabic, Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies 
3, no. 1 (1996): 51–70; Dale Eickelman and James Piscatory, Muslim Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996); Dale Eickelman “Islam and the Language of 
Modernity,” Daedalus 129 (2000): 119–135. 
7 Jenny B. White, “The End of Islamism? Turkey’s Muslimhood Model,” in 
Remaking Muslim Politics, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005), 87–111. 
Noorhaidi Hasan: New Horizon of Reading Islam and Politics                    289 
IN RIGHT 
Jurnal Agama dan Hak Azazi Manusia                                                       Vol. 4, No. 2, Mei 2015 
choose from an expanded range of options among a wider assortment of 
religious representations, both traditional and secular, manufactured, 
packaged, and retailed by specialized service agencies. This free choice in 
turn offers individuals the opportunity to patch religious fragments 
together into a subjectively meaningful whole and transform them into 
powerful symbols able to be enacted in public.8 
In the same vein Göle has argued that post-Islamist identities have 
enabled Muslims to experience the “banalization process.” Actors from 
diverse backgrounds are involved in shaping the face of Islam in the 
public space and may enter into the modern urban context with little 
hesitance. By using global communication networks they participate in 
public debates, track patterns of consumption, and study the rules of the 
market while at the same time embracing individualistic, professional, and 
consumerist values.9 This statement does not mean that Islam no longer 
functions as a source of guidance in Muslim life. Although its traditional 
function of stirring collective actions in society has faded, it serves as an 
inspiration imbued in the social and cultural imagination of the 
community, whereby society has transformed itself to accommodate 
modernization and globalization. It is as if we are seeing a synthesis 
between the wave of Islamism, on one hand, and, on the other, the 
growth of modern and secular education, and of free market values and 
democratic idioms, in the Muslim world. 
Post-Islamism can be seen as an alternative that gains ground 
amid the failure of the project that attempts to position Islam as a political 
ideology and is thereby changing the political landscape of Muslim states. 
The experiences of many Muslim states confirm that the Islamist project 
has instead stigmatized Islam and transformed it into an enemy of modern 
civilization. As an alternative to religious radicalism, post-Islamism offers 
Muslims a way to actualize religious beliefs and values while still following 
the path of modernity and globalization, without plunging into violence 
and joining a cycle of militancy. Democratic values, which form the 
foundations of practical Islam and the politics of contemporary Muslim 
                                                          
8 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), 36–37. 
9 Nilufer Göle, “Islamic Visibilities and Public Sphere,” in Islam in Public: Turkey, 
Iran, and Europe, ed. Nilufer Göle and Ludwig Ammann (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi 
University Press, 2006), 3–43. 
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society, suggest that being a democratic Muslim is no longer an 
oxymoron.10 
In the context of Indonesia the roots of post-Islamism began to 
gain ground in tandem with the rise of the new Muslim middle class, 
which has gotten involved in the debates about objectifying Islam. Their 
rising demands for a more nuanced lifestyle—as the Islamic revival has 
swept across Indonesia since the 1980s—urged them to adopt Islamic 
symbols as a mode of modern cultural expression in public spaces.11 
Islamic symbols appear in middle-class attempts to construct new 
narratives of themselves and their place in the world from creative blends 
of their own cultural inheritance and global influences.12 In response to 
the growing demand for the availability of religious space within the urban 
landscape of metropolitan and big cities, luxury Islamic centers, with a 
large mosque as the main building surrounded by training and educational 
buildings, shops, and a hotel, have been constructed on large tracts of 
land in major cities such as Jakarta, Surabaya, and Makassar. The new 
Muslim middle class comes to these places to engage in reciting the 
Quran, chanting dhikr (the profession of the faith), and the like while 
discussing various aspects of Islam. In this way Indonesian Islam has 
experienced a process of commodification, favoring global high 
technology and catering to consumerist Islamic appetites.13 Styled in 
accordance with the (upper) middle class and new wealth’s appetite and 
symbolized by religious insignia of all kinds, the post-Islamist identity has 
fostered a pluralist vision of Islam that contributes to the burgeoning of 
democracy. 
 
C. Shades of Militant Islamism 
The proliferation of the seeds of democratic Islam faced a serious 
challenge when the wave of Islamist radicalism erupted in the aftermath 
of the collapse of Suharto’s New Order regime in May 1998. By that time, 
a number of militant Islamist groups had come to the fore and achieved 
                                                          
10 Vali Nasr, “The Rise of ‘Muslim Democracy,’” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 2 
(2005): 13–27. 
11 Moeflich Hasbullah, “Cultural Presentation of the Muslim Middle Class in 
Contemporary Indonesia,” Studia Islamika 7, no. 2 (2000): 1–58. 
12 Ariel Heryanto, “The Years of Living Luxuriously. Identity Politics of 
Indonesia’s New Rich,” in Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia, ed. Michael Pinches 
(London: Routledge, 1999), 159–187. 
13 Mona Abaza, “Markets of Faith: Jakartan Da’wa and Islamic Gentrification,” 
Archipel 67 (2004): 173–202. 
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notoriety by taking to the streets to demand the comprehensive 
implementation of the shari’a (Islamic law), raiding cafés, discotheques, 
casinos, brothels, and other reputed dens of iniquity and, most 
importantly, calling for jihad in the Moluccas and other Indonesian 
trouble spots. They had (and have) names such as the Front Pembela 
Islam (Defenders of Islam Front), the Laskar Jihad (Holy War Force), the 
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Holy Warriors Council), the 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI, Islamic Community), and the Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia (HTI, Indonesian Islamic Party of Liberation), to mention but a 
few. They sought to impose a totalitarian world order by disseminating 
religious doctrines and via activism that espoused norms, symbols, and 
rhetoric imbued with animosity. The challenge posed by these groups 
intensified when bombs exploded in a nightclub at Legian, Bali, in 
October 2002. This bombing was followed by explosions at the Marriot 
Hotel in Jakarta in 2003, outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 
2004, again in Bali in late 2005, and more recently at Jakarta’s Marriot and 
Ritz-Carlton hotels. While a moderate understanding of Islamic doctrines 
apparently remains the foundation of mainstream Indonesian Islam, the 
series of bombing attacks has served as a reminder that anti-civilian 
violence is a recurrent phenomenon in Indonesia today. 
The expansion of militant Islamist groups was clearly emblematic 
of the expansion of Islamist ideology and violent activism in the political 
arena of post-Suharto Indonesia. This ideology asserts the shari’a as the 
highest law and the single source of all legislation. Militant Islamists define 
the shari’a as containing all of God’s rules derived from the Quran and 
Sunna, which provide a comprehensive and universal guide and solution 
for every problem facing humankind. Their sense of urgency is perhaps 
heightened by the recent and protracted economic, political, and social 
crises that have afflicted Indonesian Muslim society. True and faithful 
Muslims therefore have no choice but to abide by the shari’a. Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir, the commander (amir) of Indonesian mujahidin (holy warriors) and 
leader of the ahl al-hall wa’l aqd (advisory council) of Majelis Mujahidin 
Indonesia, gave a speech to the first national congress of mujahidin in 
August 2000. He proclaimed that application of the shari’a is a 
nonnegotiable imperative and argued that its rejection must be countered 
by jihad.14 He stated his belief that application of the shari’a would lead 
                                                          
14 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, “Sistem Kaderisasi Mujahidin dalam Mewujudkan 
Masyarakat Islam,” in Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syari’ah Islam, ed. Irfan S. 
Awwas (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001), 79–90. 
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Indonesia to solve its various crises. In his eyes the shari’a proved itself by 
being the leading political system for about fourteen centuries. It 
expanded throughout the world, bringing peace, justice, and prosperity. It 
was not until 1924, when worldly temptations (penyakit kemewahan) began 
to overwhelm the Muslim ummah (community), that its superiority was 
undermined by secular ideologies.15 In an interview, he insisted that the 
shari’a is final (harga mati). It is not to be negotiated or debated. Rejecting 
the shari’a might even lead a Muslim ruler to apostasy.16 
HTI’s leader, Muhammad al-Khaththath, saw the importance of 
the shari’a as an alternative to secular ideologies, including nationalism, 
socialism, and capitalism, which are claimed to have exerted domination 
over the world but to have failed to bring humankind to a full realization 
of both its material and its spiritual dimensions. The shari’a is asserted as a 
means of establishing the khilafa system, which is the main goal of the 
organization. In al-Khaththath’s opinion, the failure to enforce the shari’a 
will steer Indonesian Muslims clear of the only Islamic system that will 
bring them out of their crises and allow them to achieve prosperity, 
wealth, and justice.17 Considering the necessity to establish the khilafa 
system, the chairman of HTI’s Central Leadership Board, Hafidz 
Abdurrahman, has highlighted that every Muslim is obliged to participate 
in any attempts toward the implementation of the shari’a.18 HTI’s 
spokesperson, Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, has emphasized that the 
existing secular system has been flawed since the beginning. It simply 
marginalizes the role of religion in the Indonesian public sphere, as the 
system treats religion as merely a personal or private matter.19 Members of 
the organization took to the streets to champion the slogan “Save 
Indonesia with the shari’a.” HTI’s belief is that Indonesia’s dependence 
on Western countries, which has brought nothing but severe economic 
and political crises, can only be eliminated through the shari’a. Yusanto 
maintains that the shari’a is a mercy for all humankind. It is relevant to all 
problems faced by all people, regardless of ethnicity or religion. Its 
                                                          
15 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, “Pemikiran Politik dan Dakwah Islam,” in Dakwah dan 
Jihad Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, ed. Irfan S. Awwas (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2003), 136-137. 
16 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, interview by the author, Surakarta, August 2006. 
17 Muhammad al-Khaththath, “Khilafah, Wajib Ditegakkan dan Perlu,” Al-
Wai’e 55 (March 2005), pp. 75-77. 
18 Hafidz Abdurrahman, “Menegakkan Khilafah Kewajiban Paling Agung,” Al-
Wai’e 55 (March 2005), pp. 12-18. 
19 Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, “Hizbut Tahrir Menolak Kepemimpinan 
Sekuler,” Pernyataan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, No. 060/PU/E/09/04, Issued in the 
demonstration in Jakarta, on September 11, 2004 . 
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universality is predicated on the universality of Islam as a religion revealed 
by God.20 
 
 
 
D. Toward the Shari’a from Below 
The militant Islamists’ discourse emphasizing the need for a 
change in the political structure as a means to implement the shari’a in a 
comprehensive manner has gradually shifted toward the application of the 
shari’a from below, in tandem with the efflorescence of Islamic popular 
culture. Trendy, colorful jilbabs (head scarves) for women and baju koko 
(Muslim shirts) for men have achieved prominence as symbols facilitating 
the interest of the Muslim middle class in demonstrating their religious 
identity as well as social status. They are involved in Islamic teaching 
sessions at five-star hotels and mass ritual programs such as dhikr akbar 
(remembrance of God) organized at grand mosques in metropolitan cities 
such as Jakarta and Surabaya. Coupled with the expansion of new da’wa 
genres, such as cyber da’wa and cellular da’wa, the growth of Islamic 
popular culture has offered Muslims alternatives in actualizing their 
religious beliefs and practices. Hence the irrelevance of militant Islamists’ 
repudiation of the state democratic system claimed to have blocked the 
Islamist dream of making Islam visible and victorious. 
Many militant Islamist leaders who had been at the front line to 
call for jihad in the conflict areas in the Moluccas and Poso, Central 
Sulawesi, now put new emphasis on the need to apply the shari’a at the 
personal level. This is considered a prerequisite for the establishment of a 
Muslim society. The attempt to raise individual awareness of the 
importance of the shari’a as guidance for Muslims in their everyday life is 
believed to be more crucial than its application by the state. After his 
release from prison in mid-2006, even Ba’asyir stated his opinion that the 
attempt to impose the application of the shari’a at the state level could 
disturb the main purpose of Muslim struggle, that is, upholding the 
principle of tawhid (obedience to God) as a foundation of Muslim belief. 
Individual consciousness of consistently applying the shari’a at the 
personal level—being a manifestation of one’s total obedience to God—
would automatically change the nation’s political landscape as a whole. In 
Ba’asyir’s opinion, his call on Muslims to participate in armed jihad against 
Christian enemies in early 2000 was linked up with the escalated conflicts 
                                                          
20 Ibid 
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between Muslims and Christians in the Moluccas and Poso. He was 
convinced that the conflicts that had killed thousands of Muslims and 
displaced other thousands was a result of the state leadership’s idle 
disregard for the fate of Muslims and also their neglect of their main task 
to make Islam’s victory into a reality. Instead, he argued, they served as a 
taghut, evil power who collaborated with the Zionists and the West to 
undermine Islam and the ummah. As a result, Indonesia had become a dar 
al-harb (realm of war) where jihad was necessitated. The fact that the 
conflicts have come to an end in parallel with the opening of more 
opportunities for Muslims to express their religious beliefs and identities, 
according to Ba’asyir, has rendered the status of Indonesia as the dar al-
harb no longer relevant. In his eyes, Indonesia is now a dar al-aman (realm 
of Islam) that enables da’wa to flourish.21 
While supporting the idea of implementing the shari’a from 
below, other militant Islamist leaders, such as former JI commander Nasir 
Abbas, stridently criticized Osama bin Laden’s fatwa on the compulsion 
for every Muslim to participate in jihad, meaning killing Americans and 
their Zionist allies wherever they are.22 In Abbas’s point of view, bin 
Laden’s jihad ideology and his pseudo fatwa on the compulsion to fight 
jihad against Americans and their allies were based on a false 
understanding about the essence of jihad.23 His criticism of bin Laden’s 
fatwa marked the shift in the ideological position of the JI leadership 
concerning jihad, resulting in conflict among them. In the same vein, 
Laskar Jihad former commander Ja’far Umar Thalib insisted that bin 
Laden was not qualified as a mufti, so his fatwa should be abandoned. 
Reiterating his persistent criticism of jihadist proponents, he highlighted 
what he understood as a danger of jihad when interpreted and applied 
wrongly by the followers of bid’a (reprehensible innovation). In his 
opinion, jihad is only legitimate under some conditions, among them that 
permission had to be obtained from the authorities and that it would only 
be for defense purposes.24 Both Abbas and Thalib were of the opinion 
that bin Laden’s call for jihad has instead brought disunity among 
Muslims and put the Muslim world into a war with the West. 
                                                          
21 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, interview by the author, Surakarta, August 2006. 
22 For more detail, see, among others, Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam 
(London: Routledge, 2007), 248–256. 
23 Nasir Abbas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah (Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI) 
(Jakarta: Grafindo, 2008). 
24 Ja’far Umar Thalib, interview, at a defunct website, www.alghuroba.org,, 
accessed March 19, 2009. 
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Aware of the political change occurring in Indonesia that 
facilitated the peace process in various conflict areas such as the Moluccas 
and Poso, as indicated above, the militant Islamist leaders did not simply 
criticize bin Laden’s interpretation of jihad; they no longer saw any 
relevance for jihad as a means of realizing the application of the shari’a. 
Instead, they argued that da’wa (Islamic proselytizing) is more appropriate 
to make Indonesian Muslims aware of their duty to uphold the supremacy 
of the shari’a. On many occasions Ba’asyir himself promoted nonviolent 
endeavors to defend Muslim solidarity and struggle for the application of 
the shari’a. He now claimed that violence gives Islam itself a bad image. In 
response to demonstrations against the Israeli war in Lebanon and 
George W. Bush’s visit to Indonesia in late 2006, Ba’asyir warned that 
demonstrators should hold peaceful protests and avoid any violent act. It 
was not the first time that Ba’asyir had called for peaceful demonstration. 
He even showed his disagreement with the path taken by Azahari and 
Noordin M. Top, two Malaysians believed to be behind terrorist 
bombings in Indonesia. In Ba’asyir’s opinion, violence associated with 
armed jihad is only legitimate when enemies are attacking Muslims, thus in 
a defensive position to protect their dignity as part of the Muslim ummah. 
As Ba’asyir has pointed out, the most suitable strategy for 
implementing the shari’a in Indonesia today is not jihad but, rather, 
informing Indonesian Muslims of the magnificence of the shari’a. In his 
eyes, this is consistent with the Prophetic strategy of da’wa to give hope 
(tabshir) and threat (indhar): the hope of heaven and the threat of hell. 
Following the Prophet, Ba’asyir related the implementation of the shari’a 
to the relationship between a person’s life in this world and that in the 
hereafter. Every individual is a leader: a leader for oneself, one’s family, 
one’s village, and above all for one’s country. Individuals are responsible 
in the hereafter for whatever they have done in this world. Political leaders 
who do not create laws to prevent their people from being condemned to 
hell will face retribution in the hereafter; they will be responsible for all 
people’s sins.25 However, this does not mean that Ba’asyir totally neglects 
the importance of jihad; he just sees da’wa as more appropriate to 
Indonesia’s current situation. He sees da’wa and jihad as twin concepts, as 
alternate ways to establish God’s laws on earth. In his eyes, the West has 
demonized and criminalized jihad because they are afraid of Muslims’ 
return to the past glorious victory of Islam. Ba’asyir argued that Islam 
becomes weak if it is separated from jihad. Only with jihad will Islam gain 
                                                          
25 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, interview by the author, Surakarta, August 2006. 
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honorable victory. However, he maintained that jihad should not be 
understood simply as holy war. It connotes any efforts to establish God’s 
laws, and da’wa in this context is considered the most suitable way to 
realize the spirit of jihad.26 
Commenting on the need to conduct da’wa in order to bring 
about the application of the shari’a, Yusanto emphasized the basic nature 
of Islam as a peaceful religion. In his opinion, jihad should be interpreted 
in its broadest sense, as any struggle for doing good deeds. This includes 
the commitment to perform daily prayers, fasting, the pilgrimage to 
Mecca, serving other people, and assisting the poor. In other words, jihad 
is no different from da’wa itself, meaning amr ma’ruf, “enjoining good,” 
and nahy munkar, “opposing vice.”27 On a similar note, M. Rahmat Kurnia, 
another HTI activist, said that HTI promoted “nonviolent da’wa” (dakwah 
tanpa kekerasan). In his opinion, “violent da’wa simply engenders negative 
impacts on Muslims and jeopardizes their struggle as a whole.”28 
 
E. Moderate Muslim Response to Radical Islamism 
The change in the militant Islamists’ discourse toward calling for 
the implementation of the shari’a from below is indubitably associated 
with the ongoing democratic consolidation occurring in Indonesia, which 
has witnessed a transition away from authoritarianism over the last decade 
or so. This dynamic began with the downfall of Suharto in May 1998, 
which brought his New Order authoritarian regime that had been in 
power for more than thirty-two years to an end. The collapse of the New 
Order regime heralded the Reformasi, which has had a tremendous 
impact on the current dynamics of Indonesian politics. Coupled with the 
weakening of state power, the far-reaching process of liberalization and 
democratization that followed Suharto’s demise opened a space in which 
large numbers of Indonesian people could discuss and develop opinions 
on the issues that affected their lives. A variety of groups, identities, and 
interests thus emerged, competing for the newly liberated public sphere. 
At the dawn of the Reformasi era, B. J. Habibie came to power as 
Suharto’s replacement and embarked on a course of political reform. He 
promised to reschedule elections, release political prisoners, decentralize 
political power, allow political parties to operate freely, and liberalize the 
press. His initiatives to meet the demands for reform brought the first free 
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27 M. Ismail Yusanto, interview by the author, Surakarta, July 2006. 
28 M. Rahmat Kurnia, interview by the author, Jakarta, 2005. 
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and fair parliamentary elections since 1955, which were held in 1999 and 
led to the election of the late Abdurrahman Wahid as president.29 More 
importantly, Reformasi paved the way for Indonesia to embark on a 
democratization process that extended people’s rule to an increasing 
number of institutions and issues and thus guaranteed popular control and 
political equity.30 Within this context Law No. 22/1999 was ratified on 
regional autonomy, devolving much of the administration’s authority to 
local governments. This law promoted democratization, thereby allowing 
Indonesian people to get involved in political life and the decision-making 
process.31 The last two successful general elections, held in 2004 and 2009, 
brought victory to the Democratic Party and brought its founder, Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, to power as the first president directly elected by 
the people. Under the leadership of Yudhoyono the effort to strengthen 
democracy, good governance, and justice has continued. 
No doubt, the ongoing democratic consolidation occurring in 
post-Suharto Indonesia has reduced the room to maneuver that had been 
available to militant Islamist groups. Broader spaces available for Muslims 
to express their interests and participate in politics have not only 
delegitimized the Islamist campaign for the establishment of an Islamic 
state but also moderated their vision about the ideal position of the 
ummah vis-à-vis the state. Moussalli has argued that there is a correlation 
between democracy and moderation in radical Islamist discourse, the 
development of which originated in a reaction to the political, economic, 
and international conditions of the Muslim world. He has further argued 
that radical violent Islamist discourse is only relevant when it is faced with 
isolation from society under conditions of social disunity, corruption, 
exploitation, and undemocratic regimes. The discourse automatically 
                                                          
29 See Marco Bünte and Andreas Ufen, “The New Order and Its Legacy: 
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moderates when the state provides sufficient spaces and freedom for 
Islamists to participate in dealing with public issues and concerns.32 
The narrowing of spaces for maneuver available to militant 
Islamist groups as a result of democratization has cohered with 
Indonesia’s increasing awareness of the danger of Islamist radicalism and 
terrorism. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, Jakarta came under 
constant international pressure to act swiftly against the alleged terrorist 
networks operating in the country. In the context of the global campaign 
against terror, the Indonesian government eventually had no choice but to 
join the international coalition to fight against terrorism. After the first 
Bali bombing in 2002, the Indonesian government took more serious 
initiatives to tackle radical religious threats and allocate a bulk of its 
resources to act against terrorism. New regulations have been enacted to 
provide legal devices for combating terrorism. President Megawati 
Soekarnoputri issued, for example, the Government Regulation in Lieu of 
Statute No. 1/2002 on War against Terrorist Crimes and Presidential 
Instruction No. 4/2002, which instructs the coordinating state minister of 
politics and security affairs to take the necessary steps to implement the 
regulation. These regulations were strengthened by Law Nos. 15 and 
16/2003 on antiterrorism. President Yudhoyono has continued the 
campaign by strengthening counterterrorist capabilities through 
networking and programs of training and education, seminars, 
conferences, and joint operations. As a result, many terrorist cells have 
been destroyed, and their operational spaces have been tightened. For 
instance, Dr. Azahari was shot by antiterror police in a raid operation in 
his hideout in Malang, East Java. His supporting cells in Semarang, 
Wonosobo, Surakarta, Sleman, and Surabaya were subsequently 
discovered. 
In tandem with the ongoing democratic consolidation and the war 
on terror, nascent opposition across the spectrum of Muslim democrats 
against militant Islamists has begun to gain ground in Indonesia. The 
wave of Islamist militancy marked by the mounting call for the shari’a and 
jihad has increasingly been seen as threatening three principles of 
democratic life: (1) the raison d’être of the rechtstaat (law state) and the rule 
of law, (2) the sovereignty of the people, and (3) the unity and plurality of 
Indonesian society. These three principles demand that state legislatures 
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Modernity, Legitimacy and the Islamic State (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999), 
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should be built, enforced, and developed in accordance with democratic 
principles. In other words, the application of the shari’a and jihad 
contradicts the principles of human rights, as guaranteed by the 
Indonesian constitution.33 More and more Muslim moderates show an 
increasing awareness of the danger of the militant Islamists’ call for the 
shari’a and jihad to multiculturalism and democracy. Together with local 
activists and elites outside the power circle, they are involved in 
movements campaigning for civic freedom.34 
Moderate Muslims concerned with this matter set up a variety of 
NGOs as loci for their activism. Examples of these kinds of organizations 
include Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL, Liberal Islamic Network), the 
International Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP), the Wahid Institute 
(TWI), and the Ma’arif Institute for Culture and Harmony, to mention but 
a few. JIL was set up in Jakarta in 2002 by a group of Jakarta-based young 
intellectuals, such as Ulil Abshar Abdalla, Luthfi Assyaukanie, Saeful 
Mujani, and Ahmad Sahal. They organized discussions, seminars, and 
workshops to disseminate liberal, progressive views on Islam. They also 
established an active Web site and a moderated chat group on the Internet 
as an interactive forum for critical debates on Islam—which frequently 
provoked heated reactions from their critics. The Web site quickly 
expanded with the establishment of media syndication. Columns and 
articles discussing progressively varied aspects of Islamic teaching spread 
widely beyond the network and appeared outside Muslim-related 
publications. Popular radio stations set up chat shows to discuss day-to-
day needs and offer answers to the problems of Muslims from the 
progressive point of view on air.35 Similar to JIL, ICIP has been 
concerned with the dissemination of progressive, tolerant, and open-
minded ideas about Islam. Under the leadership of Muhammad Syafi’i 
Anwar and Syafiq Hasyim, it actively organized discussions, seminars, 
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report, Jakarta, 2006). 
34 Ihsan Ali-Fauzi and Saiful Mujani, Gerakan Kebebasan Sipil Studi dan Advokasi 
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workshops, and conferences with the main aim of strengthening pluralism 
and multiculturalism in Indonesia.36 
While JIL and ICIP incorporated progressive Muslim thinkers 
from any segment of the faithful, TWI was established by a group of 
young Muslim intellectuals affiliated to the largest mainstream Muslim 
organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The founders include Ahmad 
Suaedy, Rumadi, and Abdul Moqsith Ghazali. A forum to disseminate 
progressive ideas by the most outstanding NU scholar and liberal thinker, 
Abdurrahman Wahid, TWI has been active in organizing campaigns for 
tolerant Islam, pluralism, and religious freedom. Various innovative 
programs have been introduced both to facilitate communication and 
cooperation between Muslim and non-Muslim progressive intellectuals 
and to enhance Muslim intellectuals’ capacity to raise awareness among 
grassroots Muslims of the importance of pluralism and democracy.37 
Progressive Muhammadiyah intellectuals led by Ahmad Syafii Ma’arif 
followed in the footsteps of their NU counterparts by establishing the 
Ma’arif Institute in 2003. Its main mission is to disseminate Islamic 
reform through interreligious dialogues and cooperation.38 Through 
various programs and initiatives, the institute serves as a forum for young 
progressive Muhammadiyah intellectuals to promote critical thinking on 
religious issues relevant to contemporary Muslim interests.39 
Beyond the boundaries of these organizations, representatives of 
mainstream Indonesian Muslims in NU and Muhammadiyah have also 
expressed their specific concern about the threats of militancy and 
radicalism. In response to the threats posed by militant Islamist groups 
who campaign for the shari’a, seek to circumscribe the rights of 
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37 Ahmad Suaedy, director of the Wahid Institute, interview by the author, 
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minorities, marginalize pluralist sentiments, and even call for jihad, these 
moderates have worked closely together to promote discourses on 
interreligious harmony, democracy, egalitarianism, and gender equality. At 
the same time, they continue to exercise a profoundly moderating and 
democratic influence on Islam and Indonesian politics, through their 
campaigns asserting that Islam and democracy are compatible and via 
their condemnation of Islamic radicalism. They have not only rejected 
proposals to implement the shari’a but also organized meetings to 
condemn terrorist actions committed in the name of Islam. To them, 
terrorism cannot be tolerated, since it is in total opposition to Islam.40 
A former NU leader and president, the late Abdurrahman Wahid 
argued that the mounting calls for the shari’a were clearly against 
Indonesian democratic ideals. His unqualified conviction was that 
democracy cannot accept the application of Islamic law. In a democratic 
nation-state, the implementation of an Islamic legal system would 
subordinate non-Muslims to Muslim citizens, in effect making them 
second-class citizens.41 Wahid’s counterpart, former Muhammadiyah 
leader Ahmad Syafii Ma’arif, insisted that Islam upholds the principle of 
unity for all mankind, whereby a culture of tolerance is encouraged. In his 
opinion, democracy has a strong foundation in Islam.42 
Ma’ruf Amin, the head of the fatwa committee of the Indonesian 
Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), strongly condemned 
terrorism perpetrated in the name of jihad. He insisted that whereas 
terrorism spreads violence and fear, jihad, when performed correctly in 
accordance with its proper conditions and rules, brings peace for the 
people. In his eyes, jihad is, in essence, Muslims’ utmost struggle to realize 
the common good. It is not terrorism. Consequently, suicide bombing 
claimed for the sake of jihad is totally forbidden in Islam.43 Amin’s 
                                                          
40 Masdar Farid Mas’udi and Masykuri Abdillah, two leading Nahdlatul Ulama 
intellectuals, interviews by the author, Jakarta, August 7, 2007, and August 1, 2010, 
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opinion on jihad and terrorism represents MUI’s official position as a 
semigovernmental body directly involved in the campaign against 
terrorism. Along with the Department of Research and Development 
(Balitbang) of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, MUI established a Special 
Team for Fighting against Terrorism through an Islamic Religious 
Approach (Tim Penanggulangan Terorisme Melalui Pendekatan Ajaran 
Islam). Within this context it issued a fatwa clarifying the distinction 
between jihad and terrorism.44 It also actively promoted the peaceful 
understanding of Islam through so-called antiviolent religious sermons 
(khutbah anti-kekerasan). In a praiseworthy endeavor, it published a 
compilation of sermons in 2006 entitled Taushiyah dari Mimbar yang Teduh: 
Kumpulan Khutbah Anti Kekerasan (Admonition from the peaceful pulpit: 
Anthology of antiviolent sermons), to be distributed to thousands of 
mosques across Indonesia.45 
 
F. The Prosperous Justice Party 
The effort made by moderate Muslims to campaign against 
Islamist radicalism by disseminating tolerant, peaceful Islam has not only 
reduced the space to maneuver available to radical Islamist groups. This 
campaign also brought a new hope for Islam’s inclusion in the state 
democratic system. In line with the transformation of Indonesia’s political 
system, new political parties have arisen to represent a wide range of 
ideologies and interests, and these include parties that explicitly espouse 
the application of the shari’a (Islamic law) and other conservative 
positions. One such example is the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK), 
which represented the growing strength of political Islam in Indonesia. 
This party was fundamentally different from the other Islamic parties: the 
United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), the National 
Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), the National Mandate 
Party (Partai Amanat Nasional), and the Moon and Crescent Party (Partai 
Bulan Bintang). Its differences were in its historical roots, its ideology, its 
political goals, and the broader electorate it appealed to. It was derived 
from the da’wa (Islamic proselytizing), Muslim Brotherhood–inspired 
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(Jakarta: Indonesian Council of Ulama, 2005), i–17. 
45 Department of Religious Affairs, Meluruskan Makna Jihad, Mencegah Terorisme 
(Jakarta: Department of Religious Affairs, 2006). 
Noorhaidi Hasan: New Horizon of Reading Islam and Politics                    303 
IN RIGHT 
Jurnal Agama dan Hak Azazi Manusia                                                       Vol. 4, No. 2, Mei 2015 
movement that preaches Islam as a total way of life and which began to 
gain ground on Indonesian university campuses in the 1970s.46 
As a party that drew its inspiration from the Brotherhood, PK 
defined Islam primarily as a political ideology and endeavored to position 
it at the center of Indonesian politics. Its vision of Islam was of a classical, 
complete, and universal system that comprehensively governs all spheres 
of social, political, economic, and cultural life. It proclaimed the shari’a as 
the only system that could rid Muslims of the multitude of problems and 
catastrophes that afflict them, all of which result from the implementation 
of secular systems. PK believed that only through the shari’a would 
Muslims be able to challenge the domination of the Western powers, 
which are in league with the Zionists to undermine Islam and the Muslim 
ummah.47 Implicit in this rhetoric was a rejection of the existing nation-
state system, seen as a weapon of the imperialist West to divide Muslim 
nations and demolish the khilafat (caliphate). It is not surprising that PK 
was very much concerned with issues of Islamic solidarity and the 
reestablishment of the caliphate.48 PK’s political manifesto demonstrated a 
clear tension between the ideal of the ummah and the reality of the 
nation-state. It was known as an avant-garde party of ikhwan and akhawat, 
popular terms used by tarbiyya members to address their fellow activists. 
Its electoral campaign pushed Islamist viewpoints and emphasized its 
exclusiveness as an Islamist party. Significantly, PK garnered only 1.4 
percent of overall votes in the 1999 elections and thus failed to meet the 2 
percent electoral threshold. 
The result of the 1999 elections forced PK to rebrand itself as the 
Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), whose vision 
further developed the ideology, thought, and systems of its predecessor 
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and its desire to establish Islam and the shari’a as the social, political, and 
legal system of Indonesia.49 However, it now gave a different emphasis to 
the party’s goals concerned more with the real issues facing Indonesian 
Muslims. It now presents itself as the party of moral reform, and rather 
than seeking direct political power it aims to show the public, through 
da’wa, what a government based on the moral principles of Islam would 
look like. The party used the slogan “Clean and caring” to launch popular 
campaigns focusing on the national issues of a weak economy and 
rampant corruption.50 To cope with the reservations shown by its secular 
nationalist rivals and Indonesian people in general, PKS sought to create a 
new image as a moderate Islamist party, adopting the national and 
democratic rhetoric. The party acknowledged the principle of a secular 
political state as a prerequisite of liberal democracy,51 the secular format of 
the Indonesian nation-state, the state ideology of Pancasila, and the 1945 
Indonesian constitution. It made these the framework of its political 
participation in the electoral democratic system. 
Despite the principle of God’s absolute sovereignty held by most 
Brotherhood theoreticians, PKS saw no contradiction between Islam and 
democracy. It argued that the community has the right to define political 
institutions via democracy, which it accepted as an instrument to infuse 
Islam into Indonesian politics.52 Reference was made to Yusuf Qaradawi, 
a moderate Brotherhood thinker, who acknowledges that the people have 
the right to govern themselves and that this does not detract from God’s 
ultimate sovereignty. This is the progressive, inclusive political Muslim 
position, which increasingly perceives democracy as incorporating the 
values that Islam advocates, including consultation, enjoining what is good 
and prohibiting evil, and resisting unbelief.53 
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Borrowing from the framework developed by Baker to analyze the 
dynamics of political Islam in Egypt, it is interesting to look at the extent 
to which the PKS’s rise represents the birth of a new Islamism with a 
much longer-term vision of social and political reform. As Baker argues, 
the new Islamists’ adoption of participatory government and their 
pragmatic approach distinguish them significantly from the first 
generation of Islamists, who sought political power in order to reform the 
social order in accordance with Islam. They are more content to contest 
elections and take up whatever seats or offices they may win. Instead of 
cultivating a defensive discourse of Islam as a religion under attack, and 
thus calling on its followers to defend it against its enemies, the new 
Islamists call Muslims to participate in the task of improving society.54 
Their thinking might be characterized as holistic, inclusive, and favoring 
dialogue. Religion is seen as just one part of the solution. It needs to be 
viewed in conjunction with national interests, economic realities, and 
cultural traditions. Given their emphasis on the national interest, they are 
open not only to collaboration with other political forces and non-
Muslims as equal partners but also to dialogue and collective deliberation. 
The new Islamists represent, as Mandaville has noted, “a broader 
generational and strategic shift identifiable in Muslim movements across 
several settings today.”55 PKS’s decision to put an emphasis on national 
interest and dialogue in its political vision indeed reflects significant 
elements in a post-Islamist trajectory. 
The opportunity to get involved in democratic, electoral, power-
sharing-based politics served as the catalyst for PKS to dramatically break 
with its rigid ideology of the totality of Islam (Islam kaffah), as developed 
by the tarbiyya movement. It believes that the Pancasila, as the 
philosophical foundation of the state, can function as the main inspiration 
for the whole process of statecraft and governance. Yet PKS does not see 
the ideology of Pancasila as a bastion of secularization, blocking all other 
political aspirations. It suggests instead that the Pancasila and democracy 
can work together with Islamic values and principles. In an elegant 
maneuver, PKS proposed the implementation of the Medina Charter 
(Piagam Madinah), the constitution of the Medina city-state under the 
leadership of the Prophet Muhammad.56 By referring to the Medina 
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Charter, PKS demonstrated the compatibility of Islam with democracy 
and, at the same time, its determination to abide by the civic principles of 
pluralism and peaceful coexistence among and within diverse religious 
groups. During the campaigns in the run-up to the April 2004 
parliamentary elections, PKS reiterated its vision as a party of moral 
reform concerned with the fight against the nation’s core problems, 
including corruption, collusion, and nepotism. The image it presented was 
of a disciplined organization, outwardly and inwardly unsoiled, free of 
corruption, and morally pure. This strategy worked well. The party won 
significant electoral support, as much as 7.34 percent.57 
PKS appears to have become more pragmatic in its drive to meet 
its political targets, particularly those of winning regional-level direct 
elections (pemilukada). It has been quick to provide loans for sympathetic 
intending candidates and has collaborated with other parties, including the 
nationalist-secular Indonesian Democratic party of Struggle (Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P) and the religious Christian 
Prosperous Peaceful Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera). In this way it has 
been able to promote its members and sympathizers to the posts of 
governor and head of district across Indonesia. PKS scored a prestigious 
victory in Depok, West Java, where its leading cadre and former minister 
of forestry under Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency, Nur Mahmudi 
Ismail, was elected as the city’s mayor. It also nominated a former high-
ranking police officer, Adang Daradjatun, and his running mate, Dani 
Anwar, for election as Jakarta’s governor and vice-governor. At that time 
the party was confident that it did not need to collaborate with other 
parties. The PKS team was defeated by Fauzi Bowo and his running mate, 
Prijanto. Despite this failure, PKS participated in the 2008 election race in 
West Java by nominating its own cadre, Ahmad Heryawan. It collaborated 
with the National Mandate Party, whose candidate Dedi Yusuf stood as 
Heryawan’s running mate. PKS won this election. This success was 
followed by another PKS victory, when its candidates Syamsul Arifin and 
Gatot Pudjonugroho were elected to the posts of governor and vice-
governor of North Sumatra in the direct elections in the same year. 
                                                                                                                                          
economic progress. According to him, what PKS has endorsed is the application of the 
Medina Charter that in essence guarantees religious pluralism. See Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera, “Mengkaji Indonesia dari Inggris” (June 20, 2008) at its defunct website, 
www.pk-sejahtera.org, accessed on March 26, 2010. 
57 Francois Raillon, “Islam and Democracy: Indonesia’s 2004 Election and 
Beyond” (paper presented at the European Institute for Asian Studies Special Briefing, 
Brussels, 2004), 2. 
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PKS’s campaign to strengthen its image as a moderate Islamist 
party open to all segments of Indonesian society (a catchall party) 
intensified in the run-up to the parliamentary elections in April 2009. Its 
pragmatic politics place less and less emphasis on ideology, and many 
voters questioned whether PKS had abandoned its Islamist agenda and 
reconciled itself to operating within the framework of Indonesian 
nationalism. They ask if the priority the party gives to electoral victory 
means that it has downgraded its religious agenda or if this merely 
represents a tactical shift in its political strategy. This sort of skepticism 
echoes the reservations held by established Muslim organizations, as 
noted above. To counter some of this criticism PKS aired a series of 
media advertisements. One of these used the slogan “The party for all of 
us” and featured a series of comments from different people of diverse 
backgrounds, from an old garbage collector to a beautiful girl wearing a T-
shirt and jeans (without a head scarf). Through these campaigns, the party 
sought to demonstrate its alignment with a moderate version of Islam. 
Despite their ambivalent position on certain issues, the party’s elite did 
not hesitate to call for civic freedom and democracy. Likewise, the 
chairman of the consultative body, Hilmy Aminuddin, repeatedly rejected 
any affinity with Wahhabism and denied allegations of their animosity 
toward traditional religious practices, such as tahlilan, yasinan, and 
mawludan. The leaders also affirmed their theological affiliation with 
mainstream Indonesian Islam, the ahl al-sunna wa’l jama’a.58 
It is worth noting that PKS’s ideological position and political 
pragmatism have also provoked criticism from the party’s members and 
sympathizers. The involvement of this so-called da’wa party in electoral 
politics has sparked debate in numerous blogs. Will its commitment to 
da’wa reshape politics, or will politics steer PKS away from da’wa?59 
People have openly queried whether the PKS legislators still retain their 
credibility as preachers (du’at) committed to Islamizing society through 
politics or whether they are simply politicians pretending to be preachers. 
Some bloggers are even questioning whether the Islamic struggle for the 
                                                          
58 See the statement made by Hilmy Muhammad at a seminar in London as 
reported in  “Ketua Majelis Syuro: Saya Sering Memimpin Tahlil dan Yasin” (July 22, 
2008), at its defunct website, www.pk-sejahtera.com, accessed April 5, 2010; see also 
“PKS Menjawab Fitnah,” (October 25, 2008), at its defunct website www.pk-
sejahtera.com, accessed on 7 April, 2010. See also a sort of self-critique article by PKS 
cadre Yon Machmudi, “PKS Mengancam Eksistensi Ormas Islam?” spread in various 
blog spots. 
59 See, for instance, debates at www.pkswatch.blogspot.com.  
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supremacy of God’s teachings can be pursued through the un-Islamic 
democratic game. Concerns about PKS’s collaboration with secular 
parties, and particularly with a Christian party like the Prosperous Peaceful 
Party, provoke the most heated debates. In fact, more and more PKS 
members and sympathizers are worried that this short-term power-
oriented political maneuver will deflect the party from its main mission of 
improving Indonesia’s political systems and practices. They believe that 
this kind of coalition simply demonstrates the hypocritical nature of 
politicians and their hunger for power. In response to discontent 
spreading among party members and sympathizers, PKS intensified the 
cultivation of da’wa as a complementary strategy to dominate the political 
landscape of Indonesia. It developed various da’wa activities, including 
halqa, daura, pengajian (religious lectures), liqa (meetings), rihla (tours), mabit 
(staying overnight), seminars, and workshops, which are deemed 
necessary as a manifestation of the tarbiyya vision to build an Islamic 
society based on the eight Brotherhood principles laid down by Hasan al-
Banna. 
The strategy to accept democracy and balance its political 
pragmatism with da’wa successfully led PKS to win 7.89 percent of the 
overall votes in the 2009 general elections. This result put the party in the 
top four after President Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party and the other two 
secular nationalist parties, Golkar and the Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle, winning 20.45, 14.85, and 14.65 percent, respectively. As the 
coalition partner of the Democratic Party, PKS has continued to 
strengthen its position as a moderate Islamic party that respects civic 
freedom and human rights. 
 
G. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the influence of the 
radical Islamist ideology and movement that attempt to transform 
Indonesia into an Islamic state by calling for the comprehensive 
implementation of the shari’a and jihad in various conflict areas in eastern 
parts of the country has significantly faded away. Attempts made by 
radical Islamists to impose a totalitarian world order by disseminating 
religious doctrines and activism that espoused norms, symbols, and 
rhetoric imbued with animosity ended in failure, and this ultimately serves 
to highlight the marginal position of radical Muslims and their 
unsuccessful efforts to popularize their discourse glorifying militancy and 
violence. In the face of this failure radical Islamists have shifted toward a 
strategy of implementing the shari’a from below (or adopting it at the 
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personal level), promoting da’wa (Islamic proselytizing), and nonviolent 
endeavors with the aim of making Indonesian Muslims aware of their duty 
to uphold the supremacy of Islam. The new course they have taken is 
considered more appropriate to deal with the current situation and the 
future challenges facing the ummah. The circle of militancy and violence 
is believed to only jeopardize the struggle for the victory of Islam. 
There are some factors contributing to the radical Islamists’ failure 
to change the political landscape of Indonesia and conversely, their 
changing strategy of calling on Muslims for the implementation of the 
shari’a at the individual level. These include the democratic consolidation 
that facilitated the opening of political opportunity in the era of Reformasi 
and the burgeoning of modern democratic idioms as a result of moderate 
Muslims’ campaign against Islamist radicalism. The opening of the post-
Suharto Indonesian public sphere has allowed moderate Muslims from 
diverse backgrounds to get involved in the debates about objectifying 
Islam, and this prevents militant Islamist actors from dominating religious 
symbols and the interpretation of religious creeds through their militant 
campaigns and from imposing their agenda of an Islamic state. For the 
sake of democracy, more and more Muslim moderates are showing an 
increasing awareness of the danger of the militant Islamists’ call for the 
shari’a, as well as the need to disseminate multiculturalism, gender 
equality, justice, and civic freedom, the universal values believed to be 
embedded in Islam as a mercy for all (rahmat li’l ‘alamin). In the midst of 
the celebration of democracy in Indonesia, the logic behind the call for 
the implementation of the shari’a as an alternative to the formerly 
totalitarian political system has automatically lost ground. 
The Indonesian government’s success in bringing the bloody 
communal conflicts in various parts of the country to an end—which 
occurred in parallel with the ongoing democratization process—is another 
factor that has urged militant Islamists to change their course, for the 
conflicts had been taken as legitimation by the militants to call for the 
need to apply the shari’a at the state level and fight jihad as a solution to 
the government’s perceived failure to protect Islam and the Muslim 
ummah. No less important were the initiatives taken by the government in 
collaboration with civil society organizations to tackle the threat of 
Islamist radicalism and terrorism. In response to mounting pressures from 
the international community, the government joined the international 
coalition against terror, under the framework of which various political, 
legal, and strategic measures have been deployed. 
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There is reason to believe that Indonesia today is in the throes of 
starting along a post-Islamist path. A sort of synthesis between the call for 
Islam’s importance for public life and democracy, post-Islamism has 
emerged as an alternative to Islamist radicalism. Through its endeavor to 
fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, as well as Islam and liberty, 
this post-Islamist alternative has enabled Muslims to express and actualize 
their religious beliefs and practices, without plunging into violence and 
joining the cycle of militancy. Discussion on post-Islamism is relevant to 
studies on the shift in the Islamic political discourse and activism 
occurring in a democratizing Indonesia, which, like other parts of the 
Muslim world, has seen huge social change as a result of globalization. 
The growth of Islam’s public visibility, which has occurred in tandem with 
the celebration of democracy, has become irrefutable evidence of the 
transforming dynamics of Islam in this country. 
The phenomenon of PKS sheds light on the relevance of the 
discussion on post-Islamism in relation to the recent dynamics of Islam in 
Indonesia. As an Islamist party that drew its inspiration from the 
Brotherhood-inspired tarbiyya movement, PKS has participated in 
electoral politics and launched popular campaigns in order to expand its 
electorate and base of support—thus winning significant votes in the 
elections. Conveying alternative political visions to a wider audience, it has 
been active in promoting clean governance, anticorruption, and 
professionalism, deemed to be the prerequisite to get rid of corruption, an 
incompetent bureaucracy, poverty, and other fundamental problems faced 
by Indonesia as a nation. Its ability to package these issues was the key to 
PKS’s success in garnering significant votes in the 2004 and 2009 
parliamentary elections, capturing, respectively, 7.34 and 7.89 percent of 
the overall votes. Despite its ambivalence toward democracy, PKS has 
also increasingly developed an inclusive political platform and altered its 
basic perception about what is permissible in a democratic environment. 
It has no doubt learned how to get involved in the electoral democratic 
games and become a proactive force contributing to the process of 
further democratic deepening in Indonesia.[] 
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